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A B S T R A C T
Citizenship and consumption have been linked for over a century, emphasizing the pivotal role played by the citizen-consumer in society as a whole, and the voting
power of the consumer's money. In the modern, digitalized world of the data economy, citizen-consumers are being assigned new roles: active market party, content
producer, distributor, and an important source of economic value formation. This article examines how the role of the citizen-consumer is transforming in the data
economy, giving a simplified account of historical continuities and discontinuities. We concentrate on the commercial side of consumer citizenship, scrutinizing two
periods in the history of technology: first, the 1930s–40s when the mobile citizen-consumer was invented, designed, and promoted by the US car industry; and
second, the post-1990s when an even greater sense of mobility was introduced by cell phones and the Internet, drawing examples from outlying yet technologically
advanced Finland. We close with a discussion of how the digital turn has given citizen-consumers new channels of operations, querying how technological change has
influenced their everyday lives.
1. Introduction
The history of ‘citizen-consumers’, who vote with their money, re-
veals a continuously changing role, connecting political, economic, and
cultural aspects of consumption in a global, capitalized world; for
women in particular, consumer citizenship, prior to gaining voting
rights, was seen as a step towards a more independent position both in
private and public life [1,2]. The emergence of the citizen-consumer is
usually considered to have taken place in the United States in the early
20th century, when consumerism and citizens' rights became linked. At
the same time, modern professional fields, such as advertising and in-
dustrial design, began actively contributing to the shaping of a new,
more mobile and materialistic lifestyle in cooperation with corporations
(e.g., Refs. [3–6]). In the 21st century, however, the Internet, social
media, and digital devices, currently accompanying us everywhere,
have transformed the role and image of consumers from that of captive
audience into a highly important source of economic value formation.
The dawn of the data economy draws even greater attention to the
consumer's active role [7–11] compared to the traditional view of the
consumer as a passive recipient of a stream of novelties. By the term
data economy, we refer to the development of a digital economy where
massive scale data is collected by everyone, also ordinary citizens, and
where data circulates faster than ever.
In this article we analyze the changing attributes of citizen-con-
sumers in the 20th century, exploring whether we have reached the
point where we can claim that the data citizen has been born. We
suggest that the citizen-consumer possesses three related features that
emerged in the latter half of the 20th century in response to education,
increasing affluence, market forces, and the development of economic
thought: firstly, during and after the Second World War it was postu-
lated that, ideally, consumers' choices should be based on their acting to
further the household's well-being and even the collective interest—by
‘buying local’, for example—although consumption choices driven by
the individual's preferences were becoming more acceptable; secondly,
choices were assumed to rely increasingly on the consistent application
of information, rather than inherited habits and customs; thirdly, with
increased freedom of purchasing choice, membership in the consumer
society became almost inevitable. Consumerism emerged as a central
mechanism of society and a model for how goods, services, and (more
generally) well-being should be distributed to citizens. Meanwhile, the
idealized image of the consumer, openly propagated by, for example,
the Century of Progress Expositions in Chicago in 1933, has been
characterized in terms of a migration from city centers to suburbs and
the rise in ownership of goods and appliances such as refrigerators,
washing machines, cars, and television sets.
The latest role to be assigned to the citizen-consumer—a product of
the Internet, social media, and digital devices—is that of ‘data citi-
zenship’, which frames the consumer as a data producer and crucial
source of value creation in the ‘data economy’. This reflects four related
developments: firstly, the collection of massive scale data by various
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sensors and tracking tools; secondly, the swift speed of data circulation
from one domain to another; thirdly, the trend of seemingly ordinary
citizens collecting, analyzing, and sharing data on their everyday life;
and fourthly, the increasing domination of the evolution of the data
economy by economies of scale and scope. One could list various
technological and cultural steps in the move towards the data economy,
such as the Smart phone, open/free source, Web 2.0, consumer gener-
ated content, and the Internet of things (e.g., Ref. [9]). Most notably,
however, the data created in the digitalized life of consumers has be-
come the prime source of economic value formation. With these steps
the scale and scope of the data economy has expanded radically during
the past few decades. As a consequence, an almost seamless global di-
gital platform with various data feedbacks has emerged.
At the same time, seemingly separate industries like retail, media,
and banking have become increasingly connected, supported, and
conditioned by data flows and control of data. Furthermore, the data
flow has enabled new opportunities for systemic changes, like a circular
economy supported by the Internet of things. So far, discussion of the
circular economy has focused on industry and production wherein re-
sources are used effectively and recycled, and waste is minimized or
used as a raw material. Citizen-consumers in the circular economy are
thought to participate in novel ways in value creation [63], adapting
new practices like sharing assets (sharing economy) or result-oriented
services. The sharing of assets, often enabled by digital platforms, fa-
cilitates more effective resource use, reducing the need for new pro-
ducts and virgin raw materials [13]. It should be noted, however, that
we are possibly witnessing a media exercise in hype with regard to this
model: a “circulation of over exaggerated expectations … which might
lead to unfounded excitement and disappointment” ([14]; 148). Inter-
estingly, similar media-exaggerated expectations accompanied the de-
velopment of the new automobile market between 1920 and 1940.
The data created in the course of the digitalized lives of data citi-
zens—and frequently recorded by the subjects—have become the prime
source of globalized, economic value formation in the 2010s [9,15],
recently giving rise to giant organizations such as Google, Apple, Fa-
cebook, Amazon, and Microsoft (e.g., Ref. [16]). The flow of data has
provided opportunities to gather information about citizen's pre-
ferences and opinions, thereby facilitating new ways of influencing
general opinions and the direction of politics [17]. Web 1.0 brought
with it an increased volume of texts from which to choose, but the
information superhighway of the 1990s was one of unilinear commu-
nication. Web 2.0, with its social networking sites, opened new possi-
bilities of dialogic communication and the consumer-production circuit
moved to two-way communication with consumer-generated content.
We can speculatively say that in Web 3.0 more business controlled and
intensive circuitry became reality. Currently textual content is in-
creasingly generated automatically with new types of data, for instance
GPS position data, and data coming from playing Internet-based com-
puter games or health tracking.
The fact that Google, for instance, could use behavioral data derived
from analyzing a user's online history in a process known as ‘cookie
matching’ links the user's likely interest with market offerings [18];
114). In a complicated process, cookies, ad-servers, ad-networks and
ad-exchanges tie people and things together. According to Zwick and
Denegri Knott [19] (referred in Ref. [18] consumers are produced as
‘novel sets of consumers’ by these technologies:
[C]omputerized information networks that continuously integrate
dispersed sites of information solicitation with simultaneous feed-
back loops do not produce stable and enclosed repositories of
meaning such as ‘individuals’, ‘individuality’ and ‘identities’, but
dynamic and functional modulations of these, or what Deleuze [20]
calls ‘dividuals’, an elementary form of ‘the control society’ ([19];
235).1
In examining the evolution of ‘data citizenship’, this article con-
centrates on the commercial rather than the political side of consumer
citizenship (cf. [3], identifying two crucial periods: the 1930s–40s
when the mobile citizen-consumer was invented, designed, and pro-
moted by the US car industry; and post-1990 when an even greater
sense of mobility was introduced by cell phones and the Internet. The
geographic locus of discussion inevitably reaches out from its epicenter
in the US, with occasional comments on how developments have been
reflected in the small, somewhat peripheral yet technologically ad-
vanced nation of Finland. Our historical examples and our research
trajectory recalls Foucault's idea that “[g]enealogical analysis traces
how contemporary practices and institutions emerged out of specific
struggles, conflicts, alliances, and exercises of power, many of which
are nowadays forgotten” [21]; 372). We focus on how big business
approaches the citizen-consumer via visionary expectation manage-
ment, noting that while the image of the consumer [67] as a passive
receiver of manufactured commodities has been replaced by one of an
active participant in a network economy, the change is, fundamentally,
limited. More tangible transformation, however, has occurred in terms
of value creation, wherein digital feedback binds consumer/data citi-
zens into a new (net)world in which consumer behaviour—buying,
selling, sharing, recycling, participating, and clicking—shapes markets
[23]. In the following, we review the trajectory of consumer citizenship
from the igniting spark of the World Fairs, through the building blocks
of the emerging data economy, to the ‘voting rights’ of data citizens,
examining how they are evolving in a contemporary world governed by
data giants, with special attention to both direct and indirect ‘data
democracy’.
2. The trajectory of the mobile consumer society
The Chicago Century of Progress exposition (1933) was a prelude to
a new era (of Art Deco, principles of streamlining, and international
style), while the New York World's Fair (1939) was a summary of the
new era's promised “world of tomorrow” ([24]; 81); both can be seen as
a response to the trauma of the Great Depression (1929–1933). The idea
that it is necessary to create needs and regulate demand was a pillar of
the New Deal, Roosevelt's response to the Depression; consequently,
advertising and industrial design, emerging during the period, com-
peted with commercial agents, politicians, and scientists in demand
creation and the making of a better America [6]. Both the new pro-
fessions aimed to prove that science and technology, art and business,
could march side by side towards a better material and materialistic
future, led and funded by modern large-scale industry [24,25]. News of
developments reached backwater Finland: the Chicago Century of
Progress exposition was lauded by Finnish newspapers, with the Ilta-
Sanomat anticipating the widespread use of artificial lighting, the dis-
appearance of windows, and a revolution of color. “From the first days
of the exposition, crowds gathered in front of these buildings, whose
forms defied all convention. And eventually they recognized their
value” (July 11, 1933).
Through their abundance of goods, the World's Fair served nu-
merous major corporations and a business-based mindset. In the spirit
of functionalist architecture, homes were referred to as machines, and
ways to extend Fordist mass production to residential construction were
discussed.2 Automotive giants General Motors (GM) and Ford presented
themselves as “cultural innovators” and creators of expectations at the
1 The term ‘dividual’ was coined by Gilles Deleuze in 1992. With this term he
describes an elementary form of ‘the control society’. Contrary to Foucault's
‘disciplinary society’—in which the individual never ceases passing from one
closed environment to another—the control society is continuously in flux and
individuals are nonexistent.
2 The World's Fair was a laboratory of the future, which the newspaper pre-
dicted would shorten the service life of buildings, as construction technologies
would quickly become obsolete. After his visit to Ford's factories, Alvar Aalto
reported to a Finnish audience on the efficiency of the assembly line and the
benefits of standardization.
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World's Fairs [6]; 111), while representatives of the new profession of
industrial design, such as Raymond Loewy, Henry Dreyfuss, and
Norman Bel Geddes, were the stage managers and directors. According
to Bel Geddes—who had moved from designing custom-made cars for
Hollywood stars to become GM's ideological spokesman—an industrial
organism requires four kinds of design: social relations, machines, us-
ability, and artistic realization. Bel Geddes was at the helm of GM's
Futurama exhibit at the New York World's Fair and a key supporter of
both streamlined sociotechnical foundations for modernity and the
belief in the power of design ([6], 130). As GM's Highways and Hor-
izons exhibit (1939–1940 in New York) promoted: “The city of 1960 –
with its abundant sunshine, fresh air, fine green parkways – [is] all the
result of thoughtful planning and design” (quoted by Ref. [24]; 93).
Streamlining reflected the popular interest in speed records and
explicit styling features that came to symbolize speed in the 1930s. This
was whetted by Bel Geddes' science-fiction-type renderings of techno-
logical utopianism in his 1932 book, Horizons, and reflected the era's
creation of Flash Gordon, Buck Rogers, and Superman. This was bound
up with an emphasis on adventure, experiences, and the American
entertainment society—all elements deliberately stressed at the World's
Fairs. Colorful entertainment created an image of democratic leisure
time in an America striving for well-being and happiness for all. The
bad times of the Depression were in the past; the current human task
was to conform, as was made clear by the slogan of the 1933 World's
Fairs: “Science Finds, Industry Applies, Man Conforms”. In other words,
a consumer was mainly seen as the end user of industrially produced
novelties. By suggesting that the World's Fairs' audience was passive,
however, we are referring to the views of major actors and big com-
panies. We recognize that a kind subjective work was done by the
spectators when interpreting and making sense of ‘never before seen
novelties’. Still, contrary to the digital economy where, we suggest,
two-way communication in the consumer-production circle is more
obvious, the voice of the audience was less recognized or it was re-
cognized only in an aggregate level of demand.
The Second World War interrupted progress until the 1950s, when
world expositions became stages for Cold War battles, and many themes
from the 1930s were raised to the power of 2 [26]. The US exhibition
held in Helsinki in 1961 was titled “Industry at the Service of the
Consumer”, and tangibly raised the needs of the consumption society in
the Finnish consciousness. President Kennedy greeted the Finnish na-
tion by saying, “We want to show you how we and others can use
industry and commerce to contribute to a better life for the whole of
humanity” (Kuvaposti, 22/61).3 Top talent from many US fields of
business attended the exposition, “the country's highest authority in the
freezing industry” gave demonstrations, and Finns also had the op-
portunity to see the vehicle of the future: Ford's Levacar could travel on
its rails at speeds of 300–800 km per hour [27].
Demand management of the New Deal (and the emerging system of
national accounts in the post-war period) meant that households were
increasingly perceived as part of the machinery of the national
economy, which could be managed through advertising and state
budgets.4 As we suggest below, a similar faith in an economic machine
controlled in accordance with management thinking has again gained
strength in the data economy (e.g., Ref. [28]). According to John
Kenneth Galbraith, it was a duty, especially of mothers, to consume
enough of the right things, although he later admitted that he had
overestimated the ability of corporations and the government to guide
the development of the economy [65]. The transition from an industrial
age, depicted as his New Industrial State (1967) to what he called the Age
of Uncertainty (1977) had been wrought amid the oil crisis.
In the 20th century, the emergence of consumer citizenship was also
promoted by other development trends such as political consumer ac-
tivism (e.g. Refs. [3,29]),—whose precursors were products of co-
operatives' activities back in the mid-19th century—and, later, the
struggle against water and electricity monopolies [2]. It was, however,
in the 1960s that the consumer policies seen today, stressing education
and legal rights, appeared on a massive scale.5 Rapid technological
development, a strong growth in supply, and the impersonal nature of
markets had created a broad range of problems for consumers, paving
the way for modern consumer policies highlighting education, con-
sumer rationality, and legislation. In line with the Kennedyesque
3Most of the kitchen inventions were purely fanciful [26], but that is not how
the Finnish press painted them: “Have a guess what this row of buttons is. …
This complex equipment is used by American housewives to cook roasts for
their families. It looks intimidatingly modern, but it must be efficient.” (Ku-
vaposti, 22/61).
4 A similar faith in controlled development started to characterize Europe
only after WWII. It was descriptive of the times that a journal titled Design of the
Country was published in Finland in the 1950s and ‘60s.
5 The 1960s can be considered the decade of the consumer citizen's birth, at
least in Finland (e.g., Refs. [27,60–62]).
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consumer-political worldview of the 1960s, early Internet (Internet 1.0)
in the 1990s was seen as an enormous database that facilitated the
circulation of information produced by companies and authorities and
that provided access to a large online selection of products and services
for the purchasing public [30].
3. Towards a mobile information society
Future-oriented media discourse, lectures, and international fairs
were crucial forums for elaborating and sharing early ideas of a ‘mobile
information society’. Central elements of a projected future society
(e.g., technical standards NMT, GSM, and UMTS) were launched by
Scandinavian telecom businesses. A few years after the introduction of
the World Wide Web, Nokia Design distributed sketches of the smart
phone and by 1996 the first conceptual images of so-called ‘third-gen-
eration mobile phones’ started to spread around the globe (e.g.Wired 9/
1999). Along with Finnish Nokia, Swedish L.M. Ericsson, British
BTCellnet, and German Siemens started to make futuristic videos de-
monstrating the benefits of next generation phones. At the turn of the
millennium the introduction of smart phones provided the freedom to
communicate where and whenever you wanted. Yet telecom business
continued to follow the example of the car industry of the 1920s–30s, in
which the consumer appeared as the recipient (and end repository) of a
stream of novelties.
Nokia was one of the first players in the telecommunication industry
openly speaking about ‘preparing the market’ for portable life-man-
agement tools (or ‘digital remote life-enrichment devices’, ‘digital
imaging devices’, or ‘media phones’). It was increasingly acknowledged
that a “capacity to invent new industries and reinvent old ones is a
prerequisite for getting to the future first and a precondition for staying
in front … a firm must unlearn much of its past before it can find the
future … the challenge is to pierce the fog of uncertainty and develop
great foresight” ([31]; 21). In the mid-90s, Hamel was a frequent visitor
to Nokia, then the world's leading mobile phone manufacturer,6 when
he and Prahalad were completing their business classic, Competing for
the Future (1994), which portrayed Nokia as a winning company
building gateways to the future. Yet, as interdependence between
companies' brand values and stock market values grew, financial ex-
pectations made it more and more difficult to publicly question the
elements of leading visions [32].
On the cover of Wired magazine (9/1999), Jorma Ollila, Chairman
and CEO of Nokia, showed off a pocket-sized Internet. A few years later,
speaking at a press conference in Barcelona, he characterized the evo-
lutionary path:
Today's launch signifies a remarkable breakthrough in this industry.
History has proven that advances in the way we communicate can give
rise to entirely new communication cultures. Much like the transition
from radio to TV, the evolution from text messaging to multi-media
messaging marks a whole new era of mobile communications, com-
bining images with sound and text. (Nokia Press release: Nokia an-
nounces 6 new products and strong support for MMS, November 19,
2001).
At the same time, the instrumental, workmanlike image of mobile
phones was smoothly changing; Nokia advertisements in Vogue and
Onboard presented the future mobile phone user as the opposite of the
typical ‘organizational man’: a sporty androgyne dreaming of release
from the pinstripe suit. In the 1990s the ‘internet in the pocket’ was,
however, more visionary thinking than real.
A century earlier, Thomas Edison and Henry Ford played similar
roles to Nokia's Jorma Ollila, with an emphasis on publicity and the
creation of expectations. For Edison, the management of media
publicity was a central element of the innovation process and the
normalization of needs, while Ford wanted the group of potential mo-
torists to be broadened from the small group of rich daredevils, cur-
rently the advertising target, to encompass workers and women.
Edison, Ford, and their contemporaries shaped the notion of the con-
sumer as primarily the recipient of new technology. Likewise, early
visions of a mobile information society were influenced by how in-
formation technology (the computer) was publicly perceived in the
1990s. In one Finnish version of the information superhighway, for
instance, there was no room for home IT activists, entertainment users,
rebel consumers, or even communicators. Households were perceived
as the end point of IT diffusion—the resting place of technology.7 No
future was envisaged for consumer interaction or versatile visual in-
formation in computer games. The attitude to consumers was fatherly
and patronizing. Official reports included few references to the con-
sumer and then only as a passive recipient, it is ‘the audience’ who must
be protected from technology via norms, legislation, and control [33].
Just as with the World's Fairs, images of the consumer were dominated
by the views of engineers, designers, and advertisers.
Interestingly, in today's business literature Nokia provides a cau-
tionary example of blindness to the potentiality of mobile phones
[9,15,16]. By the time Apple launched the iPhone in 2007, consumers
were no longer seen as passive recipients of information but as active
participants within various digital networks. The old concept of con-
sumers promoted by the unidirectional ‘information superhighway’
(frequently spoken of by US Vice-President Al Gore in the 1990s) was
challenged. Accordingly, Time magazine's person of the year in 2006
was You: “Yes, You. You control the Information Age society. Welcome
to your world” (Time January 2, 2007).
During the last ten years, a data economy based on the wide use of
smart phones and other hand held devices has sprung up: “Our phones
and cameras are being turned into eyes and ears for applications; mo-
tion and location sensors tell where we are, what we are looking at, and
how fast we are moving. Data is being collected, presented and acted
upon in real time” ([9]; 40). Importantly, however, data become va-
luable, at least in economic terms, only through travelling and circu-
lating, leading to the integration of different data flows [9,15,34].
The wildest demo videos at the turn of the millennium featuring the
smartphone of the future depicted it as a new kind of ‘remote control for
life management’ serving as an assistant, much like a secretary who can
translate, make flight reservations, and remember birthdays. At the
time, those promises seemed exaggerated, yet many such visions are
now day-to-day reality. Applications such as Snapchat, WhatsApp,
Periscope, and Instagram offer us real-time participation in something
very flimsy and transient. Even digital assistants exist: the speech-
controlled Apple Siri is already working inside mobile phones. Google
Now, Microsoft Cortana, and Facebook M are competing to assist us in
our daily actions. One of the most impressive secretaries is Amazon's
black Echo speaker; Alexa, Amazon's cloud-based voice service, can
order a pizza with it or tell you how many goals your favorite ice
hockey player scored last night.
4. The consumer's role in the data economy
The data economy of the 2000s, wherein the consumer's actions and
digital tracks have become sources of economic value formation, has
proved an excellent match to new ways of thinking [19,35–37]. In the
European union the General Data Protection Regulation GDPR has been
seen as a ‘step towards a default ownership of personal data’ [38]. The
6 According to Vice-President of Nokia: “Hamel was at that time the only
consultant who obtained wide popularity among all the people at Nokia.”
(Anssi Vanjoki, personal exchange, 15.12.2004).
7 This conclusion was confirmed by a close reading of Suomi tie-
toyhteiskunnaksi – kansallisia linjauksia (“Making Finland an Information Society
– National Policies”), from 1994, and the 13 associated rationale memos [33].
They spoke of a benevolent technological determinism. Maximization of com-
petitiveness was at the heart of the faith in reforms.
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world's five largest companies by stock value (Google's Alphabet, Apple,
Amazon, Facebook, and Microsoft) operate in a field that is only about a
decade old, wherein the citizen-consumer is envisaged as an essential
part of the data giants' machine-learning neural networks, a sensory
organ, and the core of a large resource base [39,40]. Business related to
personal data is expanding, especially in the areas of health care
[41,42], finance [10], and geographical information, with the five US-
based economic giants head and shoulders above the rest as the most
active operators and platform maintainers [15]. In critical contexts,
they are referred to simply as GAFAM.
Traditional marketing techniques (pre-digital era) all approached
the consumer as an individual subject. The new marketing technologies
construct impressions of consumers out of clustered data points of
disembodied interest, behaviors, geographical positions, and opinions:
“Markets are, as a result, not broken up into individual consumers but
increasingly constructed out of components extracted from anonymous
and aggregated consumer data” ([18]; 108). Uber is a good example of
an algorithmic system connecting the world's largest pools of data
about driver supply and passenger demand for personal transportation.
The secret of Uber has been its capacity with regard to ‘audience
building’ and ‘match making’ but also its new logic of work.
Economies of scale and scope are significant in buying, selling,
brokering, packing, unpacking, and storing data. Because of its sheer
volume, diversity, and rate of accumulation, the body of data travelling
at ever increasing speeds within networks is often referred to as Big
Data. Today, value formation and the greatest concentration of money
occur at data-integration junctions, reminiscent of wealth aggregation
around the railway hubs of Chicago and St. Louis in their time [12].
Data integrations take place when different sort of data are contrasted,
for instance in peer to peer networks or by data aggregators such as
Google or Facebook. In future we shall see increasing numbers of data
brokers or data aggregators offering combinations of data and gen-
eralizable information produced through different algorithms based on,
for example, information gathered from a peer group. PatientLikeMe,
with 600,000 members, is a prime example of a case where an informal
community has transformed into a commercially successful platform.
The strength of companies such as Google is that they hold a near
monopoly in many markets simultaneously (search, advertising, and
analytics) and can track numerous aspects of life [15]. Amazon has
moved to grocery (AmazonFresh), Google to transportation (driverless
cars), Apple and Microsoft to the wellness business (Apple watch, Mi-
crosoft Health), and Facebook to banking and payment systems (FB
chip).8 When data giants integrate data from multiple sources and fa-
cets of life, they transcend borders between business sectors. In the
health-care and insurance businesses of the future, genetic data may be
supplemented by everyday data much more critical to a person's health,
from a person's history of consumer choices, through expenditure of
time and money, to histories of physical activity [41–43]. For instance,
Google's ‘sensory activity’ entails monitoring people's Web searches,
genetics, health, media use, and spending data stored ‘in the cloud’.
Kevin Kelly [39]; one of the founders of Wired magazine, has explained
the overarching idea of Google's AI projects as being to understand the
world through ‘sensory observations’: empirical evidence and correla-
tions.
The data economy is said to be bringing a decided shift in the
consumer's role towards more active agency [8–11]. However, this
depends on whether personal data markets or personalized digital as-
sistants are considered to abuse or serve the consumer. In the process of
becoming the content provider—the sender and distributor of messa-
ges—the consumer has been given a new role as a sensory organ in the
global neural data network. In his novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, George
Orwell described a two-way telescreen that offered upper-level Party
members information on citizens and monitored their words and deeds.
Are we being offered digital assistants or home spies, sent behind
enemy lines to gather information that may benefit an enemy power? In
Orwell's vision, Newspeak was a way to standardize thinking and hence
restrict linguistic creativity. A slightly similar process is under way with
the emoji, a pictorial symbol wherein cultural ties and interpretations
are openly minimized (in accordance with the Unicode character
standard developed for computer systems).
The future is a battleground for ideas. So far, the development of the
data economy has mostly been accelerated by American data giants.
Their primary economic interest lies in opportunities to influence, on
the basis of data analysis and probability computation, the small day-to-
day choices made by millions of people. Thus, the diagnostic gaze is
focused not on fixed individuals (individi) but on ‘dividualized’ con-
sumers (dividi) [19], and on correlations between individual moments.
In a world of ‘social physics’ [44], an individual consumer is only one
electron in a group of electrons. According to Jeremy Rifkin [28]; we
must realistically admit that there is no protection of privacy any-
more—it was merely a historical curiosity that lasted for some 200
years and now must go as a new cooperative data community gains
ground.
The concept and idea of the ‘data economy’ has been launched
forcefully both by data giants and various international bodies (e.g.,
Refs. [36,45]. For policy makers, the hype that comprises this sort of
publicity can be considered “a resource as well as a pitfall, and un-
derstanding better how hype patterns take shape may considerably
increase the actors' capacity to cope with hypes fruitfully” [46]; 1626).
This applies as much to the car industry of the 1930s as the data
economy of the 2010s. Businesses mobilize concepts that have wide-
spread currency and generic appeal (for example, health and well-
being) and deal with abstract and necessarily disembodied versions of
skill and technique. It is important to recognize that there are sys-
tematic differences between the generic associational work of business
promotion and localized instances of integration of related skills, ma-
terial, and ideas by individual consumers [47]; 13; cf. [48]. The in-
flexibilities related to localizing explains the relatively slow domes-
tication of many novelties.
5. The future of the data citizen: ‘direct vs. indirect referendum’
The citizen-consumer used to ‘vote’ by buying and using products
and services; data citizens ‘vote’ by, among other means, posting,
clicking, liking, googling, navigating online, and tweeting. The loudest
and most active data citizens have the most votes, and the right to vote
is not limited by such factors as age or nationality.9 The ‘indirect re-
ferendum’ of the data economy takes place less visibly, and is not cri-
ticized with the same force and magnitude, as the ostensibly direct,
‘populist’ voting seen in social media [49]. Indeed, rather than just
every fourth year as in elections, voting is taking place all the time,
often without the conscious choice to do so. The vote-counting takes
place in a complicated ecosystem wherein diverse data sources, ma-
chine-learning networks, and economic interests meet. The outcome
might be a description of various market segments, brand communities,
or citizen profiles.
In the future, the service promises of credit-rating agencies, in-
surance companies, and health-care providers will be increasingly
8 What is now happening in the data economy happened before in railroad
companies, as integration produced larger entities, and components like rail-
road infrastructure relinquished their relative autonomy to the competitive and
cooperative networks of which they were part. Most of these structures had
become internalized as managerial and operational hierarchies within the seven
railroad giants by the end of the 19th century.
9 A good example of the volume of a data referendum is the few hours of
social-media outrage that led the Finnish Minister of Finance to repeal a decree
by the Ministry of Finance on commemorative coins to be released to celebrate
100 years of Finnish independence in the spring of 2017.
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based on data pertaining to our day-to-day existence, including facial
expressions gathered by means of billions of sensors and turned into
customer profiling by black-box algorithms and other methods [50].
Data giants will sell the raw material in their databases, which, in turn,
will be studied via methods such as sentiment analysis, topic modeling,
and neural-network analysis (e.g., Ref. [51]). Consumer markets will no
longer be controlled through one-directional advertising propaganda
wherein an individual consumer could simply be a recipient of mes-
sages; already, the control is executed through models and derivatives
that describe and approximate average reality and consumer collec-
tives. The consumer is also becoming a passageway to all the (raw)
materials that can be monitored by the Internet of things, and the flow
of materials will be encouraged by novel models of businesses wherein
solutions instead of goods are ways of creating value. The database is
the factory of the future. Circulation of data creates new markets and
disrupt old information monopolies. In future the fight is increasingly
between American GAFAM giants (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon,
Microsoft) and their Chinese cousins BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent)
[52]. No European major players exist. Even Russia (Yandex) and Japan
(Rakuten) beat Europe in this competition.
The integration of mass-produced consumer data is based on a range
of different, both deliberately generated and accidental (perhaps even
random) practices of quantifying and summarizing people's day-to-day
lives [50]. As with sentiment analysis, can we also talk about the sen-
timents and moods of entire nations? And how could the ‘votes’ of in-
dividuals be summarized into general-level data that could be traced for
use by, for example, insurance companies? Perhaps we could even
speak of ‘voting paradoxes’ associated with data citizenship, in re-
ference to the analyses by Nobel Prize winning economists, Kenneth
Arrow [53] and Amartya Sen [54]. In their so-called impossibility
theorems, they showed it to be impossible, or at least anything but
trivial, to derive an unambiguous social welfare function or a pre-
ference order from individual preferences.
6. The citizen-consumer becomes a data producer
In the early stages of the consumer society, the consumer was
mainly a recipient of goods and services with a place in the grandstands
of the Century of Progress. If we cut a few corners, we can say that the
consumer's freedom of choice and rational decision-making abilities
were acknowledged with the modern consumer ethos which developed
in the 1960s. The neoliberalism of the 1980s further strengthened this
kind of economic thinking. In the 1990s, however, the notion of the
citizen-consumer received new emphasis. The consumer/producer di-
chotomy was increasingly questioned: for example, in marketing and
innovation (see Refs. [7,22,55,56]). New business models in the ser-
vice-oriented businesses and the sharing economy also started to
strengthen consumers' roles as producers, while their part in the value
creation cycle was recognized in the notion of the circular economy
[63,64]. Starting with Web 2.0 and augmented by social media, the
consumer started to appear as a ‘prosumer’ and co-innovator [9,23].
Table 1 illustrates this change.
Media scholar Bolin [57] has developed more thoroughly the dif-
ference between the two types of audience represented by consumer
feedback in pre-digital and Web 2.0 eras. In Bolin's terms the data
economy integrates two types of logic and conceptualizations of ‘au-
dience’ which were quite separate in the pre-digital era [57]. Identity
work and the meaning-making of the consumer were the focus in the
cultural view, whereas political economy focused more on profits made
through statistical analysis of aggregate audiences. In the digital era
some of the work involved in consumption (meaning-making, sharing,
etc.) became accessible to the media industry. The digital economy has
radically transformed the consumer-production circuit by making social
and textual work (cf. subjective) more eminent. The Internet, social
media, and digital devices that follow us everywhere have changed the
economic nature of consumer activism. The citizen-consumer has, for
instance, become a content producer for ‘hybrid media’ and a dis-
tributor of news [58]. Meanwhile, business activists argue the need for
audience building and matchmaking [15,59].
The first steps of modern (commercialized) consumer-citizenship
were taken back in the early stages of industrialization, when the roles
of the producer (as waged worker) and consumer started to diverge. In
the 20th century, the expanding supply of commodities and services
established the consumer as a passive recipient, a visitor to world fairs
who was part of the audience during the Century of Progress. In the
1950s and 1960s the Western citizen-consumer began to be perceived
as a rational chooser in a world full of options, a kind of data processor
reminiscent of a computer. Towards the end of the century, the citizen-
consumer became more of a co-producer in production and innovation
processes. Ideas such as ‘crowdsourcing’ and the ‘sharing economy’ are
manifestations of this thinking wherein consumer feedback matters.
Furthermore, both the sharing and the circular economy partly re-
instate a world where producer and consumer are not discrete, by
combining the roles (sharing) and suggesting that the consumer is im-
portant to value creation.
It is generally said that in the data economy the data citizen is the
most important source of value generation. There is a tradeoff: the
consumer gets to take part in data creation and has a new global
window, meanwhile becoming a sensory organ for a global intelligence
network run by data giants. An important issue is whether the critical
consumer movement will remain in touch with reality. Another inter-
esting question concerns the future of democracy and civil society. If
the assumption of information-hungry and competent digital citizens is
wrong, data-economy promises relating to the almost limitless expan-
sion of frictionless data circulation will not be kept. So far, as Intel's
anthropologist Dawns Nafus has correctly emphasized, “free data is free
for the taking but useless unless it can be re-contextualized and re-
interpreted” ([8]; 221).
7. Conclusions
In this article we have given a simplified account of historical
continuities and discontinuities in a process in which ‘citizen con-
sumers’ have transformed to ‘data citizens’, a source of value genera-
tion, more recently sensory organs for a global intelligence network run
by data giants. We have concentrated on the commercial rather than
the political side of consumer citizenship, identifying two crucial per-
iods: the 1930s–40s when the mobile citizen-consumer was invented,
designed, and promoted by the US car industry; and post-1990 when an
even greater sense of mobility was introduced by cell phones and the
Internet.
In the early 20th century, the expanding supply of commodities and
services established the consumer as a passive recipient, a visitor to
world fairs who was part of the audience during the ‘Century of
Progress’. In the 1950s and 1960s the Western citizen-consumer began
to be perceived as a rational chooser in a world full of options, a kind of
information processor reminiscent of a computer. Towards the end of
the century, ‘business visionary speech’ start conceiving the citizen-
consumer as co-producer and co-innovators. Current ‘data citizenship’
Table 1
Technological changes influenced the evolution of citizen-consumer.
Technological change Evolution of citizen-consumer
The rise of car industry Freedom to move
Consumers vote with their money
Information highway Consumers as passive recipients
Internet Freedom to communicate
First smart phones
iPhone Consumers as active participants
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is a product of the Internet, social media, and digital devices. This re-
flects four related developments: firstly, the collection of massive scale
data by various sensors and tracking tools; secondly, the swift speed of
data circulation from one domain to another; thirdly, the trend of
seemingly ordinary citizens collecting, analysing, and sharing data on
their everyday life; and fourthly, the increasing domination of the
evolution of the data economy by economies of scale and scope. Most
notably, the data created in the digitalized life of consumers has be-
come the prime source of economic value formation. With these steps
the scale and scope of the data economy has expanded radically during
the past few decades. As a consequence, an almost seamless global di-
gital platform with various data feedbacks has emerged.
So far, the development of the data economy has mostly been ac-
celerated by American data giants. In the future the fight is increasingly
between American GAFAM giants (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon,
Microsoft) and their Chinese cousins BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent).
Their primary economic interest lies in opportunities to influence, on
the basis of data analysis and probability computation, the small day-to-
day choices made by millions of people. Thus, the diagnostic gaze is
focused not on fixed individuals (individi) but on ‘dividualized’ con-
sumers, and on correlations between individual moments.
Following from these developments we suggest that citizen-con-
sumer used to ‘vote’ by buying and using products and services; data
citizens ‘vote’ by, among other means, posting, clicking, liking, goo-
gling, navigating online, and tweeting. The loudest and most active
data citizens have the most votes, and the right to vote is not limited by
such factors as age or nationality. The ‘indirect referendum’ of the data
economy takes place less visibly, and is not criticized with the same
force and magnitude, as the ostensibly direct, ‘populist’ voting seen in
social media. The vote-counting takes place in a complicated ecosystem
wherein diverse data sources, machine-learning networks, and eco-
nomic interests meet.
The data economy has changed the scenery of information circula-
tion; nowadays citizen-consumers communicate with each other via the
Internet, producing data that have become very powerful tools both in
politics and markets. Furthermore, the data economy has changed how
markets operate in several fields, transforming car sharing, home
renting, and other forms of sharing and circulating into new forms of
economic activity. It has combined private persons and companies in
new ways, turning consumers into prosumers. One can argue that this
change has given consumers and citizens powerful new channels
through which to make choices and exert influence, but also that it has
made the consequences of such choices harder to understand and pre-
dict.
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